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Abstract 
The arguments for refinancing the European Union’s (EU) higher education via higher 
tuition fees largely rest on preserving the profitability of the educational investment 
and offering deferred and income-contingent payments. Using income survey datasets 
on Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) we first estimate how graduates’ 
private return on educational investment is likely to be affected by higher private 
contributions. We then evaluate the effect of income-contingent and deferred payment 
mechanisms on lifetime net income and its capacity to account for graduates’ ability 
to pay, considering numerous ways of financing the cost of introducing income-
contingency. Our analysis reveals that increasing individuals’ contributions to higher 
education costs, through income-contingent and deferred instruments, does not 
significantly affect the private rate of return of heterogeneous graduates, allows for 
payments to be indexed to ability to pay, and can be implemented in ways that 
minimize the risk of adverse selection. These findings prove robust to significant 
variations between countries’ unharmonised higher education institutional structures. 
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I.  Introduction 
A debate on the future of higher education financing is raging at the heart of recurrent 
policy discussions at national and European levels: should tuition fees be increased to 
support the effort of Europe's higher education sector to strengthen its quality and 
maintain its attractive position compared to the US and emerging countries? In most 
European countries, public financing has been considered the traditional approach to 
financing higher education. Pressures to reform the existing funding structure through 
a different sharing of the burden between taxpayers and students/graduates are 
increasing due to the evolution of the higher education market structure, changes in 
the economic structure, demographic developments, and increased competition within 
existing public service activities for finite public funds. 
 
In terms of public policy, the simplest way to increase private contributions is to raise 
tuition fees. Expressed as a percentage of the lifetime wage premium of a typical 
graduate, higher fees might still appear relatively small and harmless. However, 
proper evaluation of a higher tuition fee policy requires more than merely estimating 
the financial hardship imposed on the average graduate. Quite evidently, if some 
prospective students face credit or liquidity constraints they will not undertake higher 
education, even if wage premia and private returns remain relatively high. By contrast, 
they should not be deterred if fees are deferred. The other major point is that lifetime 
income heterogeneity among graduates1 justifies focussing on the income-contingent 
payment of deferred fees. These might produce completely different incentives and 
degrees of vertical justice from up-front fees or traditional loans. Income-contingent 
payments are indeed the only way to take account of the fact that graduates face 
diverse lifetime income prospects.  
 
The case for deferred payments also rests on problems with information (Barr, 2001 
and 2004; Chapman, 1997). It is often claimed that private contributions should be a 
function of a student's income or ability to pay. But the former mainly consists of 
future earnings that are not known at the time of the investment. Consequently, 
enforcing this principle requires deferring its implementation to a time when the 
student’s resulting income is verifiable, through an income-contingency scheme. 
Finally, for political-economic reasons, this mechanism should facilitate the 
implementation of reforms in the financing of higher education by limiting the 
immediate potential negative effects of a new mechanism for sharing costs between 
the various stakeholders. As stated by Barr (2001), higher education could remain free 
at the point of use. 
 
                                              
1 It seems that traditional estimates of the return on higher education investment have 
underestimated the level of income heterogeneity among graduates. In the US, there is 
growing evidence that changes in wage inequality are increasingly concentrated at the very 
top end of the wage distribution, and observed among highly-educated workers (Lemieux, 
2006). 
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Regarding deferred and income-contingent payment mechanisms, a distinction should 
be introduced between loan and equity contracts (Barr, 2001, 2004; Greenaway and 
Haynes, 2003; Jacobs, 2002). An income-contingent loan (ICL)2 allows students to 
raise capital based on their promise to repay a fixed amount, contingent on the 
additional revenue generated by their investment in higher education. In the case of 
equity contracts – also known as human capital contracts (HCC) – students commit a 
fraction of their future income for a predetermined period of time in exchange for 
capital (Palacios, 2004). Income-contingency is direct in the case of HCC, as payment 
is defined as a percentage of earnings. For ICL, the level of private contribution 
depends on the propensity of graduates to earn more (or less) than a predetermined 
income threshold, generally defined as the mean income among individuals who did 
not attend higher education. 
 
Income-contingency operates as an insurance against loss of income, but induces costs 
that need to be shared within the cohort of graduates (risk pooling) or transferred to 
taxpayers (risk shifting). Risk pooling is a system where the cost of default is shared 
amongst graduates. The higher cost of providing income-contingency to categories 
like women or graduates from less profitable fields of study could otherwise be shifted 
to the taxpayer via subsidies to individuals (borrowers) or investors (lenders)3. Each 
of these options needs to be carefully examined, bearing in mind the problem of 
adverse selection inherent in insurance mechanisms. 
 
Using data on income and employment for a small sample of European countries (UK, 
Germany and Belgium), we estimate payment flows for the various instruments 
(HCC, ICL) and for different categories of individuals with contrasting lifetime 
income profiles. Our analysis reveals that private income-contingency instruments are 
relatively effective at indexing contributions to lifetime income, thus limiting negative 
redistribution effects. In contrast with tuition fees paid up front or via normal loans, 
income-contingency generates a significant difference between low- and high-income 
graduates. Finally, we introduce the insurance dimension of income-contingency, 
paying particular attention to the cost of this insurance and the problem of adverse 
selection. We show that the cost, per EUR invested, of providing insurance to 
graduates ranges from 0.32 EUR (UK) to 0.37 EUR (Germany). This cost can be 
pooled amongst graduates with the risk of creating adverse selection through an 
inadequate pooling of high and low risk individuals. We show that payments by 
graduates with the most profitable prospects (Master’s degree graduates) are inflated 
by up to 19% when pooled with Bachelor’s degree graduates who face lower lifetime 
income. The cost to males of being pooled with female graduates can be more than 
20%. To complete the analysis, various policy options are considered in order to 
                                              
2 Student loan terminology is not yet stabilized. Some authors like Palacios (2004) prefer to talk of loans 
with income forgiveness.  
3 Chapman (2005) explains that the mechanism implemented in Australia from 1989 onwards is 
essentially an ICL system with risk shifting in the sense that the government covers the cost of non-
repayment.  
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address this issue: risk shifting, risk pooling with separation, and risk pooling with 
compulsory participation of students. 
 
This paper relates to an emerging literature on the use for the financing of higher 
education of new instruments that somehow overcome all these limitations. Friedman 
(1955, 1962), in the US, and Glennerster and Wilson (1968), in the UK, initiate the 
idea of income-contingent student contributions. Barr (2001 and 2004) provides 
arguments in favour of income-contingent loans (ICL); while Palacios (2004) 
introduces the concept of human capital contracts (HCC). However, particularly in the 
European context, the empirical evaluation of these instruments remains limited. 
 
Our empirical framework is connected to the approach developed by Jacobs (2002), 
investigating, in the case of the Netherlands, the consequences of using graduate tax 
or ICL systems for financing higher education. We pay greater attention to 
confronting the outcomes of income-contingent schemes than to those of more 
traditional instruments like up-front fees (FEE) and finance by taxation (TAX). Our 
paper also enlarges the analysis, first by considering HCC, and second by referring to 
a small sample of European countries exhibiting differences as to the way higher 
education, labour market and fiscal policies are designed. The paper also considers the 
various ways of financing the cost of income-contingency acknowledging adverse 
selection. Hence, it provides a more complete assessment of alternative higher 
education payment mechanisms. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II details the simple empirical model we 
use to assess the outcomes of different deferred income-contingent solutions (ICL, 
HCC) and the benchmarks, higher up-front fees (FEE) and taxation (TAX). In Section 
III we present the income and employment data for Germany, Belgium and the UK, 
and in Section IV the upper bound estimates of the reduction in the private rate of 
return (PRR), caused by (cumulated) tuition fees of up to 20,000€. This section aims 
to gauge the financial disincentives for the average graduate generated by higher fees, 
on the pessimistic assumption that they have no positive effect on earning prospects 
(through the educational improvements they finance). In Section V we show that in 
order for heterogeneous graduates to enjoy the returns computed in Section IV, and to 
achieve vertical justice, payments should be determined via income-contingent 
mechanisms. Furthermore, ICL, HCC, FEE, and TAX are compared in terms of their 
relative capacity to account for students’ lifetime ability to pay. Section VI discusses 
financing the insurance inherent in income-contingency schemes, and in particular 
how to address adverse selection whilst pooling heterogeneous graduates. Section VII 
is the conclusion. 
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II.  Model 
Refinancing Europe's higher education amounts to identifying ways to raise additional 
funding per student, INV.4 This amount complements5 the current level of (cumulated) 
public funding per student.  
 
I.1.  Lifetime income 
In order to properly assess the consequences of collecting INV from individuals, we 
first need to measure lifetime income of different types of graduates and non-
graduates. If yj,k(a) represents the level of net income of a representative individual of 
age a and higher education status j (i.e. graduate (j=g) or non-graduate (j=ng)), and of 
type k (bachelor vs. master, male, vs female...), the present value of his cumulated net 
income, evaluated at, for instance, age 24, is: 
 
Yj,k= Σa [yj,k(a)(1+τ)a-24/(1+r)a-24)] (1) 
 
with: 
-  a ranging from the age individuals start earning an income till the 
moment they retire; 
- τ capturing total factor productivity gains (technological progress, 
capital deepening, etc.); 
-  r representing the usual discount factor6. 
 
In all cases hereafter, income should be understood as net income, including net 
wages and replacement earnings. This reinforces our assumption that extra 
contributions to higher education are in addition to current levels of taxation, and 
independent from current social transfer programs.  
 
II.2.  Higher tuition fees and average lifetime private rate of return 
Increasing private contributions to complement current public funding will increase 
students’ lifetime cost of studying. Our first investigation is thus how the lifetime 
profitability of higher education is affected given an increase in private contributions. 
If fees are raised, the average graduate is asked to contribute Cg=INV. Being private, 
this contribution is deducted from the current lifetime net wage premium (Yg - Yng). 
Ceteris paribus, this reduces the private rate of return (PRR): 
 
PRRg= (Yg - Yng - Cg) /(dur (1-χ) FYg) (2) 
                                              
4 We assume hereafter that INV corresponds to a cumulated amount covering all years of study. 
5 Some authors like Jacobs (2002) model private finance mechanisms as substitutes to public 
finance. Although very sensitive when it comes to policy-making, this distinction does not 
fundamentally affect the results of the modelling exercise.  
6 The preference for the present is captured by the return on risk-free and long-term bonds. 
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where  
-  Cg=INV is the additional contribution of the typical graduate; 
-  Yg - Yng is the cumulated net income premium of a representative 
graduate evaluated at the age of 24; 
-  dur is the duration of higher education;  
-  FYg is the present value of forgone income for the typical graduate, it is 
a function of the level of income non-graduates are able to accumulate 
during the period of study; 
-  0<χ<1 is a parameter reducing the importance of foregone income, 
reflecting income students get by taking part-time jobs.  
 
Here we focus on the direct and negative effect of fees on the private rate of return 
(PRR). We will abstain from considering the induced changes in enrolment rates. 
Finely modelling and evaluating the price elasticity of higher education demand in 
Europe is clearly beyond the scope of the paper7. Intuitively, a sharp reduction in PRR 
may weaken individual’s incentives to undertake advanced studies, or prove to be 
very unpopular. By contrast, a small reduction might have less of an effect and be 
more acceptable. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that Eq. 2 represents an upper bound of the effect of 
fees on private returns. This expression ignores the potentially positive effect of 
additional finance on the earnings prospects of individuals. These may arise through 
improvements to internal efficiency of the higher education system which translate 
into higher wages for graduates8, or higher growth rates induced by human capital 
externalities. 
 
It is even more important to realize that analysing how the average graduate 's PRR 
would be affected by higher tuition fees is just a preliminary step. Properly evaluating 
the higher private contributions proposal requires further considerations: Eq. 2 
implicitly assumes that there is no credit or liquidity constraint, and more importantly, 
Eq. 2 might understate lifetime income heterogeneity amongst various types of 
graduates. The existence of credit or liquidity constraints9 could prevent prospective 
students from undertaking higher education, even if it appears that PRR remains 
relatively high and unaffected by higher tuition fees. Deferred contributions are 
obviously a way to circumvent the liquidity constrains specific to time of study. 
Lifetime income heterogeneity amongst graduates10 is the other major reason why ICL 
                                              
7 The empirical evidence on the elasticity of higher education demand to tuition fees is still 
debated. Jacobs (2002) reports that estimates for the Netherlands suggest that enrolment is 
hardly price-responsive. Similarly, in the US empirical evidence is mixed (Heckman and 
Carneiro, 2003). 
8 Dale and Krueger (1999) report an elasticity of income to higher education spending of less 
than 0.1 which is not statistically significant, particularly when they allow for self-selection.  
9 For a discussion of the prevalence of credit constraints among prospective higher education 
students, see Chapman (2005). 
10 It seems that traditional estimates of the return of higher education investment have 
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and HCC might generate completely different private returns, and degrees of vertical 
justice, than FEE or traditional loans. The evidence is that graduates face 
heterogeneous lifetime income prospects. Implementing vertical redistribution and 
ensuring that each type k graduate achieves a return equals to the average one captured 
by Eq. 2 requires some adaptation of payments; in other words income-contingency. 
Assuming the terms of the denominator of Eq. 2 play a minor role – implementing 
income-contingency amounts to indexing a type k graduates' contributions (Cg,k) on 
her level of income (Yg,k).  
 
PRRg ≈PRRg,k= (Yg,k - Yn  - Cg,k) /(durk (1-χk) FYg,k) (3) 
if Cg,k/Yg,k is the same for all k 
 
II.3.  Instruments of finance 
As suggested above, we need to model various schemes of private finance (ICL, 
HCC), and properly evaluate the shape of the resulting distribution of contributions 
amongst types k of graduates Cg,k. We simultaneously model the outcomes of FEE and 
TAX as benchmarks. 
 
We assume that the various schemes used to raise INV a priori apply to all students11. 
The deferred payment schemes take the form of contracts which take effect when 
students turn 19 and last a predetermined period D: from the moment the student 
receives the capital INV to cover tuition fees (19)12 until the moment they make their 
last payment (19 +D). For simplicity of exposure, we neglect potential differences 
across countries regarding the length of studies and the timing of labour market 
entrance. We assume, in the case of ICL and HCC, that graduates start paying when 
they turn 24. D thus includes a grace period of 5 years. In the case of TAX, the 
additional public resources financing a particular cohort's higher education takes the 
form of public debt issued when individuals reach 19. Reimbursement of this public 
debt, via higher taxes, also starts at age 24 and ends at age 19+D13. Finally, throughout 
this paper, interest rate r should be seen as a discount factor, reflecting economic 
agents' preference for the present, not as a parameter crucially influencing the cost or 
distributional properties of ICL and HCC.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
underestimated the level of income heterogeneity amongst graduates. In the US, there is 
growing evidence that changes in wage inequality are increasingly concentrated at the very 
top end of the wage distribution, observed amongst highly-educated workers (Lemieux, 
2006). 
11 We will discuss this particular point in greater detail in Section VI when examining the 
problem of adverse selection. 
12 To simplify, we assume that students are paid in full, at the beginning of their studies. 
13 Strictly speaking, non-graduates start paying taxes before the age of 24. However, this more 
realistic modelling option, fundamentally, would not change our results. 
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i)  Human capital contracts 
Characterising the human capital contract (HCC) amounts to finding a value of θ such 
that the present value of lifetime payments by a typical graduate (all types k pooled) 
equals the value of the investment14;  
 
INV  = θ Yg (4) 
 
with  
 
-  INV ≡ inv(1+r)5  the value of additional investment on higher education 
(inv), expressed in EUR, at the age of 24 (the end of the grace period of 
5 years);  
-  Yg ≡ Σa [yg(a) (1+τ)a-24/(1+r)a-24)] the present value of the sum of net 
income, with yg(a) the annual income/age function for a representative 
graduate (j=g); 
-  a ranges from 24 to 19 +D ; where D is the duration of the human 
capital contract (eg, 25 years), that include a grace period 
-  r representing the discount factor or interest rate on risk-free capital; 
 
ii)  Income-contingent loans 
Modelling income-contingent loans (ICL) consists of finding the value of the annual 
instalment Ω such that: 
 
INV  = Ω Мg  (5) 
 
with : 
-  a ranges from 24 to 19 + D; where D is the duration of the ICL; 
-  Мg ≡ Σa [μg(a)/(1+r)a-24)] the present value of the sum of probabilities of 
payment for a typical graduate (all types k pooled) over the period 
considered, with μg(a) ≡ Prob(yg(a) >Θ(a)) the probability of payment at 
age a, Θ(a) being the age-specific annual net income threshold under 
which no payment is required. It is defined as the average income 
observed amongst non-graduates15. 
 
iii)  Benchmarks 
In our analysis, we systematically confront the outcomes of income-contingent 
instruments like ICL and HCC with those of the more traditional up-front fees and 
taxation. 
 
                                              
14 We refer here to cumulated investment over the whole period of study. 
15 This particular threshold has an economic justification that can be traced back to the seminal 
work of Friedman (1955): private contributions should only be levied on the fraction of total 
income that can be ascribed to college or university attendance. 
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Up-front fees 
 
We abstract from the idea that fees are paid annually and assume the value of fees 
(FEE) at age 24 is simply equal to INV . 
 
Income taxation 
 
Raising tax is the other traditional way of financing higher education. We first 
consider financing by (deferred) higher income taxes (ITAX). In such a framework, 
the problem is to find the percentage of additional taxation η such that: 
 
α INV = η [αTg + (1-α)Tng] (6) 
 
where: 
-  a ranges from 24 to 24+D- 5; where D is the predefined horizon of the 
public debt;  
-  Tg≡ Σa [tg(a) (1+τ)a-24 /(1+r)a-24) the present value of the stream of 
income tax paid by graduates (all types k pooled) , evaluated at age 24, 
with tg(a) the expected amount of annual income tax; 
-  Tng≡ Σa [tng(a) (1+τ)a-24 /(1+r)a-24) the present value of the stream of 
income tax paid by non-graduates with tng(a) the expected amount of 
annual income tax; 
-  α is the share of graduates in a cohort ; 
 
After dividing both sides by α, (6) becomes: 
 
INV  = η[Tg + ψ Tng] (7) 
 
with ψ ≡ (1- α)/α the relative importance of non-graduates vis-à-vis graduates ; greater 
than 1 if, as expected in most EU countries, graduates represent a minority of the 
cohort. 
 
General taxation 
 
A more realistic approach of finance by taxation (GTAX) is to assume that only a 
(country-specific) fraction 0<δ<1 of tax receipts comes from progressive income 
taxation. The residual part could come from fiscal instruments that operate more like a 
lump-sum levy (LS). In that context, we need to calculate the per-tax payer lump-sum 
levied LS such that 
 
LS = (1- δ)α INV (8) 
 
with δ the relative importance of income tax in the country’s total tax receipts/State 
budget. 
 
and finding η′ < η such that 
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δ INV = η′[Tg + ψTGng] (9) 
 
Using (5) it is immediate to show that ηδ= η′ 
 
II.3.  Distribution analysis 
In order to assess the impact of each type of finance scheme modelled above (HCC, 
ICL, FEE, ITAX, GTAX) on the private rate of return (Eq.2), and on vertical 
redistribution, we compute the present value of the cumulated contribution for each 
instrument m and each type k of individual (C_mk), where k reflects the idea of 
heterogeneity among graduates and other individuals (Yjk)16. 
 
The various contributions made can be written: 
C_HCCg,k = θ*Yg,k ; C_HCCng,k= 0  (10) 
C_ICLg,k=Ω*Mg,k ; C_ICLng,k = 0 (11) 
C_FEEg,k= INV; C_FEEng,k=0 (12) 
C_ITaxj,k= η*Tj,k , j=g,ng (13) 
C_GTaxj,k= LS* + η′* δTj,k , j=g,ng (14) 
 
with:  
 
-  θ*, Ω*, η*, LS* and η′*  being the respective solutions to Eq. (4), (5), (7), 
(8) and (9); 
-  Yg,k≡Σa [yg,k(a) (1+τ)a-24/(1+r)a-24)] ) the present value of the stream of 
net income earned by graduate of type k, with yg,k(a) as her annual net 
income at age a; 
-  a ranging from 24 to 19 + D; 
-  Mg,k≡Σa [μg,k(a) /(1+r)a-24)] the sum of probabilities of payment for type 
k graduate, μg,k(a)being the probability that she pays at age a; 
-  Tj,k≡Σa [tj,k(a) /(1+r)a-24)], with tj,k(a) as the expected income tax paid at 
age a either by graduates (j=g) or non graduates (j=ng); 
 
It is worth having a closer look at Eq.10 and 11. Using the definition of θ* (Eq.4) and 
Ω* (Eq.5) we have indeed that 
 
C_HCCk = INV Yg,k/Yg (15) 
C_ICLk=INV Mg,k /Mg (16) 
 
First, Eq.15 and 16 show that contributions under HCC and ICL for the average 
graduate are strictly equivalent, from an intertemporal point of view, to those made 
under FEE. Second, they show why HCC and ICL are bound to result in  contributions 
that vary according to type k.  Furthermore in Eq. 15  HCC contributions by each type 
k are seen to be dependent on only his relative cumulated income (Yg,k/Yg). Similarly, 
in Eq.16 ICL contributions are indexed on the relative likelihood of payment 
(Mg,k/Mg). 
                                              
16 The notion of type and how it is built is developed in Section III. 
 13 
 
A simple way to capture each instrument’s ability to link contributions to income is to 
divide the present value of contributions, for each type k, by the present value of their 
cumulated net income over the period.  
 
Π_mj,k= C_mj,k /Yj,k (17) 
m= HCC, ICL, FEE, ITAX, GTAX  
j=g,ng 
 
Finally, it is also useful to stress that, from a distributional point of view, up-front fees 
(Eq.12) are equivalent to traditional loans. At age 24, the value of contributions made 
via a loan without income-contingency clause (no possibility to default) is strictly 
equal to INV, for every type k of graduates.  
 
III.  Model specification and data 
We used OECD data (Table 1) to quantify the country-specific parameters used across 
all simulations: α (the share of graduates in the population) and δ (the share of income 
tax in the total tax receipts of the country).  
 
Table 1: Country-specific parameters 
Country Duration of 
Master 
programs 
Duration of 
Bachelor 
programs 
Share of 
graduates 
in a cohort
α 
Share of 
Masters 
among 
graduates 
β 
Share of 
income taxes 
receipts in 
total taxes 
δ 
Belgium 5 3 0.38 0.47 0.63 
Germany 5 3 0.22 0.62 0.64 
United Kingdom 5 3 0.36 0.20 0.46 
 
Source: OECD (2005) 
 
National household surveys provide our principal data. For Belgium, we use the 2002 
wave of the Panel Study on Belgian Households (PSBH). The datasets for the UK and 
Germany are the 2000 wave in CHER17. For representative samples of individuals 
(Table 2) these national surveys provide information on annual net and gross yearly18 
earnings (and thus amount of income tax), participation to labour market, working 
hours, personal characteristics (age, gender and education) or place of residence. In 
                                              
17 Consortium of Household Panels for European Socio-Economic Research, Luxembourg that 
get its data for Germany and the UK from the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP) and 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
18 PSBH and CHER always define earnings and income as ‘last year income’. 
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the models above, the key variables are the net income profiles (y(a)), taxation 
profiles (t(a)) as well as the probability of paying loan instalments (μ(a)). In this 
section we estimate these profiles or parameters using data on income, employment 
rates and tax payments of both higher education graduates and non-graduates, 
separately for three European countries – the UK, Germany and Belgium. In the 
context of ICL, these data can be used to estimate the risk that a graduate’s net annual 
income falls below a certain threshold and, consequently, exonerates her from paying 
her annual instalment. 
 
PSBH (Belgium) provides information about wages, while CHER (Germany and UK) 
gives data on both gross and net income (earnings + replacement earnings). In the case 
of Belgium, in order to estimate the level of net (y) and gross income (gy) we add 
estimates of replacement earnings (rep) to net (w) or gross wages (gw). The former 
corresponds essentially to unemployment, health and disability or early-pension 
benefits19.  
 
Individuals’ type k is identified by combining information on gender, education 
(highest degree obtained by respondent), and region of residence. Education is a four-
type variable : i) less than secondary ii) completed secondary iii) Bachelor graduates 
(3 years) and (iv) Master graduates (5 years)20; while the residence variable is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if people work in the presumably wealthier regions21 and 
zero if they live elsewhere. At the most disaggregate level the number of types is 16.  
 
For each country, we then use individual income data to estimate income and taxation 
by age profiles. As a first step, individual net income (yi) is used to estimate the OLS 
coefficients of a second order polynomial function of experience (18), separately for 
each type k as well as for more aggregate categories (i.e. all graduates (j=g) and non-
graduates (j=ng), all types k pooled) : 
 
yi,j,k = νj,k + ξj,k ei,j,k + ςj,k(ei,j,k)2 + εi,j,k (18) 
 
where potential work experience (ei) is defined as the number of years since 
(theoretical) graduation age (i.e., 17 for secondary school drop-outs, 19 for those with 
secondary education; 23 for higher education graduates)22. 
                                              
19 A presentation of these estimations is given in the appendix. 
20 The first two categories of education form what we call the non-graduates, the latter, the 
graduates. 
21 Flanders in Belgium, Länder in the former Western Republic of Germany, and Greater 
London for the UK. 
22 Unfortunately, our data do not provide the actual labour market experience. 
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Table 2: Sample statistics for individual survey data. The sample size and 
breakdown by education level and gender are also given. 
Country Gender Less than 
secondary
Secondary Higher 
education 
(Bachelor*) 
Higher 
Education 
(Master**) 
Total 
Belgium Male 569 639 347 358 1,913 
  Female 573 731 510 302 2,116 
 All 1,142 1,370 857 660 4,029 
Germany Male 872 2,711 574 943 5,100 
  Female 832 2,386 369 756 4,343 
 All 1,704 5,097 943 1,699 9,443 
United Kingdom Male 850 316 829 418 2,413 
  Female 1,012 292 705 358 2,367 
 All 1,862 608 1,534 776 4,780 
 
* non-university ** university 
Source: CHER 2000 for Germany and the UK, PSBH 2000 for Belgium 
 
Using (Eq. 18) OLS coefficients, we then compute net income by age23 profiles 
(yj,k(a)) for each type k, but also for more aggregate categories. Examples of these 
profiles are displayed in Graphs 1 and 2.  
 
                                              
23 The shift from income/experience to income/age function is immediate. We simply use the 
relation between age and potential labour experience (i.e. a ≡ theoretical graduation age + e). 
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Graph 1: Annual net income fluctuations. Breakdown by degree. Male. All 
regions (1=total population, all ages, average income) 
 
 
 17 
 
 
Graph 2: Annual net income functions/profiles. Breakdown by degee. Females. 
All regions (1=total population, all ages, average income) 
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Next, we estimate the expected gross income and income tax by age profile. This is 
done in two stages. We first estimate the OLS coefficients of the gross income (gyi) 
regressed on a second order polynomial of net income (yi)24. We then compute the 
gross income by age profiles as such (gyj,k(a)) by applying these OLS coefficients to 
the values generated by net income by age profile (yj,k(a)). Taxation profiles are 
simply generated by the difference between expected net and gross income (tj,k(a)≡ 
gyj,k(a)- yj,k(a)). 
 
We use the net income/age profiles to compute net present value of cumulated income 
Yj,k (Eq. 1). Following Jacobs (2002), we assume a 2% average growth rate of the 
level of earnings (τ), reflecting the idea that technical progress generates productivity 
gains that somehow benefit all individuals25. We also assume a discount rate (r) of 
4%, equal to the historical return on risk-free European bonds. Results, displayed in 
Tables 3 and 4 suggest, within each country examined here, the presence of sizeable 
differences across types k of individuals even after progressive income taxation and 
transfers (Graph 3). They also clearly show, as expected from the human capital 
literature, that higher education graduates can expect much higher cumulated net 
income. These estimates also confirm the persistence of significant gender gaps.  
 
To assess the incidence of income-contingency for the ICL case, we define for each 
individual graduate an age/experience-specific payment dummy (Payi,g,k (e)), by 
comparing her level income (yi,g,k (e)) at a certain point of her career, with an 
experience-specific threshold Θ(e). The latter is defined as average net annual income 
amongst non-graduates with similar professional experience. In technical terms, it is 
equal to Θ(e) =νng + ξnge + ςnge2, where νng , ξng ,ςng are obtained by estimating Eq.18 
using all non-graduates (j=ng and all k types pooled). In other words, higher education 
graduates should pay only if their annual net income is above the average income of 
non-graduates. This is a way of ensuring that contributions are levied on only the 
benefits obtained from achieving higher education26. Each time annual net income is 
below the (experience-specific) no-payment threshold we conclude a default (Payi,g,k=0), 
and to normal payment of instalment Ω otherwise (Payi,g,k =1).  
 
                                              
24 This is done by pooling all available observations. 
25 In the case of Belgium or Germany, but also the Netherlands (Jacobs, 2002), this might be a 
lower bound. Long-term statistics of hourly wage growth suggest actual rates can reach 3%. 
26 M. Friedman's seminal work (Friedman, 1955) suggests that private contributions should be 
indexed to the fraction of income that can be imputed from higher education. 
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Table 3: Present value of lifetime (24-65) net income estimated at the age of 24 in 
EUR. Breakdown by country, education level, gender and region 
Highest degree obtained 
Country Gender Region Less than 
secondary Secondary
Higher 
Education  
(Bachelor) 
Higher 
Education  
(Master) 
Wallonia and Brussels 419,978 565,221 669,357 804,842 
Female 
Flanders 403,004 578,869 625,045 832,310 
Wallonia and Brussels 690,404 888,250 847,211 1,096,633 
Belgium 
Male 
Flanders 676,380 848,462 962,819 1,121,024 
East 516,126 599,269 682,692 849,727 
Female  
West 468,835 605,562 749,238 901,750 
East 864,345 923,025 1,220,946 1,365,637 
Germany 
Male 
West 873,676 981,504 1,188,522 1,373,691 
All except G. London 454,893 544,194 663,286 968,123 
Female  
Greater London 449,160 566,464 743,815 1,048,364 
All except G. London 864,519 996,717 1,063,618 1,369,549 
United 
Kingdom 
Male 
Greater London 884,847 934,262 1,063,980 1,236,351 
 
Assumptions: τ=0.02. r=0.04 
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Table 4: Relative present value of lifetime (24-65) net income estimated at the age 
of 24. Breakdown by education level. gender and region (1= category with 
maximal lifetime net earnings) 
Highest degree obtained 
Country Gender Region 
Less than 
secondary Secondary
Higher 
Education  
(Bachelor) 
Higher 
Education 
(Master) 
Wallonia and Brussels 0.37 0.50 0.60 0.72 
Female 
Flanders 0.36 0.52 0.56 0.74 
Wallonia and Brussels 0.62 0.79 0.76 0.98 
Belgium 
Male 
Flanders 0.60 0.76 0.86 1.00 
East 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.62 
Female 
West 0.34 0.44 0.55 0.66 
East 0.63 0.67 0.89 0.99 
Germany 
Male 
West 0.64 0.71 0.87 1.00 
All except G London 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.71 
Female 
Greater London 0.33 0.41 0.54 0.77 
All except G London 0.63 0.73 0.78 1.00 
United 
Kingdom 
Male 
Greater London 0.65 0.68 0.78 0.90 
 
Assumptions: τ=0.02. r=0.04 
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Graph 3: Current average income tax (ie. taxes as % of gross income) according 
to level of gross income (i.e. tax progressivity) 
 
 
 
The specification used for the probability of payment is a logistic function, with a 
third order polynomial function in potential experience as the argument. Again, the 
estimation is run separately for each type k as well as for more aggregate categories 
(i.e. all graduates (j=g) and non-graduates (j=ng)). 
 
μi,j,k ≡ Prob(Payi,j,k=1|ei,j,k) = 1/[1+exp(-(ρj,k + ςj,kei,j,k+ σj,k(ei,j,k)2 + ξj,k(ei,j,k)3)] (19) 
 
Estimated probability of payment according to age27 (uj,k(a)) are plotted in Graph 4 for 
both Bachelors and Masters graduates. The highest probability of payment (or lowest 
risk of default) is observed amongst Masters graduates. Graph 4 clearly suggests that 
in Belgium and the UK, the insurance effect of ICL is likely to be more important for 
students who attend Bachelor programs. This feature does not emerge in the case of 
Germany. This graph also indicates that the probability of payment varies with age. In 
Belgium, and to a lesser extent in Germany, it rises between the age of 24 and 30, 
particularly for students who graduate from Masters programs. This could be due to 
                                              
27 Again, the shift from income/experience to income/age function is immediate (i.e. a ≡ 
theoretical graduation age + e). 
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the fact that, in these two countries, graduates on the labour market take longer to 
realise their income potential. Between ages 30 and 45, in every country considered, 
the probability of payment declines moderately. However, it rises quite dramatically 
beyond age 50. A possible explanation for this could be the growing employment gap 
between graduates and non-graduates, particularly the well-known concentration of 
early retirement amongst those less educated. 
 
Graph 4: The probability that higher education graduates pay their income-
contingent instalment according to age 
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IV.  Fees and the private rate of return 
The financial profitability of higher education attendance for the average graduate, 
and its sensitivity to enhanced tuition fees is our first result. We compute the value or 
the private rate of return (PRR Eq.1) for values of investment (INV) ranging from 0€28 
to 20,000€. The income for student jobs parameter (1-χ) is set to 0.9 meaning that 
these jobs generate 10% of the annual income of a non-graduate29. Our results are 
displayed in Table 5. Here we compare the cumulated net income of the average 
graduate (Yg) with that of someone who completed upper secondary education (Yng). 
 
Table 5 shows significant differences across countries in terms of private rate of return 
(PRR). Belgium is the country with the lowest level of private profitability. More 
importantly, however, Table 5 states that the level of PRR is relatively unaffected by 
increases to private contributions. Raising the private cumulated contribution to higher 
education costs (Cg) by 20,000 €, in Belgium, would, at most30, reduce the PRR by 
less than 1 percentage point (from 4.66% to 3.87%). In Germany and the UK we 
observe similar reductions (8.85% to 8.17%. and 6.79% to 5.94%, respectively). 
 
                                              
28 The status quo. 
29 This is a fairly conservative assumption according to the EU literature (de la Fuente, 2003). 
30 Remember that these simulations ignore the possible positive effect of spending on 
subsequent income. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity of the marginal (i.e. per year of study) private rate of return 
(PRR) to different values of human capital investment (INV)*– Reference = 
lifetime income of individuals (males or females) with upper-secondary degree 
Cumulated investment 
(INV) in EUR Belgium Germany UK 
0 € 0.047 0.088 0.068 
1,000 € 0.046 0.088 0.068 
2,000 € 0.046 0.088 0.067 
3,000 € 0.045 0.087 0.067 
4,000 € 0.045 0.087 0.066 
5,000 € 0.045 0.087 0.066 
6,000 € 0.044 0.086 0.065 
7,000 € 0.044 0.086 0.065 
8,000 € 0.043 0.086 0.065 
9,000 € 0.043 0.085 0.064 
10,000 € 0.043 0.085 0.064 
11,000 € 0.042 0.085 0.063 
12,000 € 0.042 0.084 0.063 
13,000 € 0.041 0.084 0.062 
14,000 € 0.041 0.084 0.062 
15,000 € 0.041 0.083 0.062 
16,000 € 0.040 0.083 0.061 
17,000 € 0.040 0.083 0.061 
18,000 € 0.039 0.082 0.060 
19,000 € 0.039 0.082 0.060 
20,000 € 0.039 0.082 0.059 
 
Given Eq. 15 and 16, these values correctly reflect the sensitivity PRR to higher private contribution 
of for FEE, ICL and HCC when considering the average graduate.  
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V.  Income-contingent contributions and distributional issues 
Two salient points can be drawn from the discussion in Section III. Prospective 
students might face liquidity constraints, and, as showed in Tables 2 and 3, 
considerable income heterogeneity exists amongst graduates. Thus we might expect 
ICL and HCC to produce completely different incentives and degrees of vertical 
redistribution than up front fees (FEE) presented in Section IV, even if the latter are 
automatically transformed into mortgage-like loans. 
 
We need to compute contributions C (Eq. 10-14) for each type k of individual to 
determine how individuals with different cumulated income prospects are likely to be 
treated, and how their private rate of return is likely to be affected. Only this will tell 
how various instruments perform, regarding their capacity to account for the ability to 
pay of individuals, and whether they uniformly maintain the PRR at the level 
displayed in Table 5.  
 
In all simulations presented below, the amount of money invested (INV) at the age of 
18 is arbitrarily set to 5,000 €31 (i.e., 6,083 EUR at the age of 24). We account for the 
fact that the proportion of a cohort that is likely to graduate, α, varies significantly 
across the three countries examined here (Table 4). The same holds for the share of 
tax receipts δ that is likely to come from progressive income taxation. The levels of 
contributions by instrument (C_m,j,k Eq. 10-14) (in EUR at the age of 24) are reported 
on the vertical axis of Graph 5, whilst the horizontal axis corresponds to the 
cumulated level of net income for each type of individual considered (Yj,k)  
 
The first interesting result is the comparison between ICL and HCC. Both instruments 
ensure that those facing lower cumulated income prospects contribute significantly 
less. Furthermore, the distinction between these income-contingent instruments and 
the up-front fee (FEE) regime is particularly striking. In the case of HCC, 
contributions range from 4,000 € to slightly more than 8,000 €. We observe similar 
figures for ICL where all students invest/borrow the same amount of 5,000 € (i.e., 
6,083 € at the age of 24). Despite minor pattern differences across countries, there is 
broad evidence that income-contingent, private instruments do account for lifetime 
ability to pay. 
 
                                              
31 5,000€ represent 10% (Germany) to 13% (Belgium, the UK) of the 2002 cumulative 
expenditure per student over the average duration of tertiary studies (0ECD, 2004) 
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Graph 5: Present value of contribution (Ck) for a 5,000 € investment, according 
to the present value of income (Yk) over the duration of the contract (D=25). 
Breakdown by instrument of higher education finance 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 
Graph 6 is based on the same results as Graph 5. Values on the horizontal axis 
correspond to the income of the various types of individuals (Yj,k). Unlike Graph 5, 
contributions on the vertical axis are now expressed in percentage of total lifetime net 
income (Π_mj,k= C_mj,k/Yj,k Eq.17).  
 
Expressed in relative terms, the contributions required by HCC and ICL contracts 
worth 5,000 € represent a fairly small fraction of lifetime net income (between 0.48% 
for Germany and 0.78% for Belgium). Although, these percentages are logically 
higher than those graduates would pay as taxpayers, were higher education refinanced 
via taxation (ITAX and GTAX).  
 
The shape of the curves on Graph 6 tells us whether contributions are indexed on 
lifetime income or ability to pay. Graph 6 shows whether the private rate of return 
(PRR) displayed in Table 5 is likely to be valid for all types k of individuals, and, 
consequently, whether financial incentives could be preserved uniformly across the 
distribution of income. A flat curve (HCC, ICL) would indicate that the instrument is 
capable of indexing contributions to income. A rising (GTAX) or declining curve 
(FEE) likewise shows no such indexing.  
 
An important result, visible in Graph 6, is thus that ICL and HCC do guarantee that all 
type k graduates face identical reductions of PRR. If we combine this particular result 
with those of Section IV, we can conclude that increasing individuals’ contribution to 
higher education costs – provided it is done via ICL or HCC – does not significantly 
affect the private rate of return. This holds not only for the average graduate but also 
for each type k. 
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As for vertical redistribution, a flat curve is indicative of the ‘proportionality’ (the 
contribution is equal to the same fraction of income for each type k (Eq.12)). A 
declining curve suggests ‘regressivity’ (a declining average contribution) whilst a 
rising curve would be synonymous with ‘progressivity’ (a rising average 
contribution). Thus, both HCC and ICL satisfy the principle of ‘proportionality’. 
Notably in Belgium, finance by income taxation (ITAX) is ‘progressive’. We see, 
however, that more general forms of taxation (GTAX), particularly in Germany and 
the UK, could be ‘regressive’. Finally, it should be noted that up-front fees (FEE)32, in 
each country considered, appear as very ‘regressive’ instruments. 
 
When comparing the two income-contingent instruments (Graph 6), we observe that 
HCC does not dramatically dominate ICL in its ability to index contributions to 
income. By definition, HCC is a scheme where contributions are strictly proportional 
to income (Eq. 4). By contrast, ICL, as it is modelled here, results in discontinuous 
contributions: below a predefined threshold, a graduate's contribution is nil, whilst 
above that threshold it amounts to a lump sum (Ω). We did not anticipate that ICL 
could make wealthier graduates contribute as much (in relative terms) as their poorer 
peers. 
 
Analytically, this result means that lifetime average probabilities of paying (defaulting 
on) ICL, estimated for each (broad) type of graduates k are closely linked to income 
pattern. By dividing both terms in Eq.11 by Yj,k we have C_ICLj,k/Yk=Ω Mj,k/Yj,k, 
where Mj,k is the (discounted) average probability that income is above the threshold Θ 
(Eq.5). Hence, if Mj,k/Yj,k is relatively constant across all types of graduates, ICL 
generates relative contributions that are constant. 
 
The reason we verify this condition is threefold. First, we retained a relatively high 
income threshold (i.e. average income amongst non-graduates). It is obvious that 
lower values of Θ would increase the average probability of payment M to the point it 
reaches its maximum above a certain level of income; with the consequence that 
relative contributions would decline33. The second reason is more empirical. In 
countries such as Belgium, Germany and the UK there are downward fluctuations in 
income, even amongst successful graduates. Occasionally, this results in graduates 
earning less than non-graduates (i.e. M is not equal to its maximum). Third, although 
we make considerable efforts in this paper to account for the heterogeneity amongst 
graduates, our categorisation remains coarse (males vs. females, Masters vs. 
Bachelors). What we fundamentally detect is the capacity of ICL to account for inter-
type, but not inter-individual, income differences. Working with the full distribution 
of income would probably produce results more in line with what we anticipated. 
Indeed, the probability of graduates who form the very top percentiles of the income 
distribution ‘crossing’ the threshold line tends to zero. Hence, different values of Y 
                                              
32 They can be considered equivalent to conventional loans from a distributional point of view. 
33 We discuss this point further in the next section. 
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could lead to identical values of M, with the consequence that M/Y does not remain 
constant. 
 
Graph 6: Present value of contribution for a 5,000 € investment in percentage of 
net income (Ck/Yk), according to the present value of income (Yk) over the 
duration of the contract (D=25); breakdown by instrument of higher education 
finance 
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VI.  Income-contingency as an insurance mechanism 
Providing students with income-contingency is certainly a way to avoid distorting 
private rates of return (PRR) between types k of graduates. It is simultaneously a way 
to achieve vertical justice. It is also equivalent to insuring their human capital, 
partially34. From a political-economy perspective, income-contingency raises three 
interrelated issues: 
i)  the size of the resulting insurance costs 
ii)  the importance of implicit transfers35 between (easy to identify) categories of 
students and  
iii)  the various ways of coping with the resulting adverse selection problems.  
 
The cost of income-contingency 
Our analytical framework can be used to quantify the cost of income-contingent 
instruments. The term cost, here, points to the additional resources that (somehow) 
need to be spent to offer income-contingency to graduates. In this sense, the exercise 
is equivalent to that of computing the risk premium due to payment default. For 
example, Eq. 5 describing ICL can be solved with and without using the probability of 
payment weighing factor μ. So far, we have considered the case with a risk of non-
payment (μ<1) and that gave us a plausible value of the annual instalments with 
income-contingency (Ω). Assuming the absence of payment default μ=1, we can 
estimate the risk-free instalment (Ωrf) that could be requested from graduates. The 
ratio between the two instalments (Ω/Ωrf = 1+rp, with rp>1) reflects the cost of 
income contingency. 
 
Table 6: Finance by Income-Contingent Loans (ICL); the cost of ensuring 
income-contingency 
Country 
Current value 
of a 1000 € 
tranche 
investment* 
INV (1+r)5 
Yearly 
instalment 
with risk of 
default 
Ω 
Yearly 
instalment 
with no risk 
of default 
Ωrf 
Risk 
premium
Ω/Ωrf - 1
Interest 
rate 
charged 
with no 
risk of 
default 
a 
Interest 
rate 
charged 
with risk 
of default
b 
Interest 
rate risk 
premium
b-a 
Belgium 1,217 110.89 83.39 0.33 4.00% 6.59% 2.59% 
Germany 1,217 114.04 83.39 0.37 4.00% 6.80% 2.80% 
UK 1,217 110.39 83.39 0.32 4.00% 6.55% 2.55% 
 
*D=25 years 
                                              
34 Full insurance protection would compensate graduates for the loss of earnings by providing 
replacement income. 
35 The logical consequence of payments indexed on ability to pay, highlighted in Section V. 
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Our computations (Table 6) suggest a value for rp ranging from 0.32 (UK) to 0.37 
(Germany). Thus Income-contingency costs on average up to 0.37 € per EUR 
invested. An alternative measure is provided by the interest rate risk premium (last 
column of Table 6). We estimate it using an internal rate of return (IRR) algorithm. 
This risk premium ranges from 2.55 (UK) to 2.80 (Germany) percentage points. The 
tentative conclusion is that income-contingency – as specified here with all the 
distributional benefits it entails (uniform PRR across types k, vertical justice) – is 
relatively expensive especially when applied to large and heterogeneous populations 
of students. One could argue that a lower income threshold would reduce the cost of 
income-contingency. However, this would also induce a countervailing effect. ICL 
would be closer to up-front fees or ordinary loans, implying that the distributional 
properties mentioned above, and highlighted in Graph 6, would vanish pro rata the 
lowering of the threshold. 
 
Risk pooling, implicit transfers and adverse selection 
One option to provide income-contingency, and avoid high non-take up rates amongst 
risk-averse students, would be to pool the cost of default amongst students. This is a 
system where the risk of default and its cost are shared amongst graduates. This 
principle of pooling was used for the Tuition Postponement Option at Yale University 
– an ICL scheme – in the early 1970s. It has been widely viewed as inefficient. Its 
main disadvantage is to put the borrowers at some risk, depending on the likely future 
income capacity of the borrowing class. More particularly, many potential high 
earners choose to exit the income-contingent repayment scheme to avoid the risk of 
getting into a cohort with too many potential low earners. This is a typical illustration 
of an adverse selection problem.  
 
In order to highlight the potential importance of adverse selection in the European 
context we compute the implicit transfers taking place under risk-pooling across a 
large (and diversified) set of students36. Computations reported in Table 7 suggest 
that, in the case of HCC, the cost for Masters program graduates to be pooled with 
Bachelors program individuals in Germany represents only a 2% increase in the 
percentage points of income the lender is likely to request (θ). But this is relatively 
low compared to Belgium’s figure of 13% and the UK’s, 19%. Hence, it seems clear 
that risk-pooling can imply significant redistribution from those with high lifetime 
income to those with lower income. Estimates in Table 7 reveal that an HCC scheme 
implemented with Masters-only graduates37 is less expensive than a scheme including 
Bachelors. This potential reduction of cost could be sufficient to trigger a secession as 
low risk graduates would be tempted to form a separate scheme synonymous with 
lower contributions.  
 
                                              
36 Remember that we have assumed so far that the various instruments apply to all students. 
37 Mainly university programs 
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Coping with Adverse selection: a menu-based approach 
 
Separation 
 
An option to avoid the negative effect of pooling is to discriminate amongst risk 
categories. In the context of higher education finance, this would imply investing less 
money in the education of riskier students. In the case of an HCC, this means 
imposing that investment (INV) by (say) Bachelors students represents only a fraction 
0<λ<1 of the one made by their peers. Adverse selection will be avoided when this 
fraction λ will be such that pooled contribution (θp) is equal to the one faced by 
Masters program graduates in a non-pooling context (θMaster).Using the relationship 
INV=θ Y (Eq. 4), we can thus identify λ, by solving: 
 
θp ≡ [β θMaster YMaster+ (1-β) λ θBachelor  YBachelor] / Yp= θMaster (20) 
 
with: 
-  0< λ < 1  
-  β being the proportion of Masters graduates in the total population of 
graduates; 
-  YP= βYMaster + (1-β)YBachelor 
 
It is then immediate38 to show that  
 
λ= θMaster /θBachelor 
 (21) 
 
Results in the last column of Table 7 reveal that the typical HCC investment on a 
Bachelors student should be equal to a fraction λ equal to 74% (UK), 79% (Belgium), 
and 90% (Germany) of that of a Masters student. Interestingly, this reduction factor is 
inferior to what we would expect in systems with uniform annual fees across higher 
education institutions but varying lengths of programs. Considering that Bachelors 
programs last 3 years, whilst it takes 5 years to complete a Masters, we should end up 
with a loan size ratio of 3/5 (i.e. 60%). In other words, pooling Bachelors and Masters 
students, with uniform annual fees (e.g. 1,000 EUR), would precipitate the need for 
investment size adjustments to counteract adverse selection. This remedy might also 
be applied across different subject specialisations. To avoid adverse selection induced 
by having higher-earning graduates (e.g. Engineering majors) subsidising the non-
payment of a lower-earning graduates (Fine Arts majors), the latter should simply 
borrow less money. 
 
                                              
38 β θMaster YMaster+ (1-β) λ θBachelor YBachelor= θMaster Yp . Using the definition of Yp we get β θMaster 
YMaster+ (1-β) λ θBachelor YBachelor = β θMaster YMaster+ (1-β) θMaster YBachelor . Eliminating equivalent 
expressions on both sides, and isolating λ, we eventually obtain λ = θMaster/θBachelor  
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Table 7: Human capital contracts (HCC): 5,000 € investment; percentage of 
income over the duration of contract (24-44) committed depending on degree of 
pooling amongst graduates 
Country Category (k)  
Percentage of net 
annual income 
committed* (θ) 
Cost of 
pooling a/b 
Adjustment factor to 
avoid adverse selection
λ= θMaster/θBachelor: 
All graduates 
pooled  a 1.35%   
Graduate Master b 1.20% 1.13 0.79 Belgium 
Graduates Bachelor c 1.51%   
All graduates 
pooled  a 0.98%   
Graduate Master b 0.97% 1.02 0.90 Germany 
Graduates Bachelor c 1.08%   
All graduates 
pooled  a 1.04%   
Graduate Master b 0.87% 1.19 0.74 UK 
Graduates Bachelor c 1.17%   
 
* Duration of contract (D)=25 years  
 
Considering the consequence of pooling male and female Master graduates, Table 8 
reveals that in Belgium, female students should be allowed to borrow only 80% of 
what their male peers borrow/invest. The fraction is lower in the UK (72%) and 
Germany (63%). Whilst quite similar in magnitude to those reported above, these 
results shed a completely different light on what can be achieved via separation of risk 
categories. In fact, Table 8 helps us identify the limits of that strategy. If 
differentiating (cumulated) tuition fees between Bachelors and Masters students is 
largely perceived as logical and legitimate, differences of treatment between other 
categories of students is strongly opposed, or simply illegal. Gender discrimination is 
prohibited by European law (Gender Discrimination Act). 
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Table 8: Human capital contracts (HCC): 5,000 € investment; percentage of 
income over the duration of contract (24-44) committed depending on degree of 
pooling amongst male and female Masters graduates 
Country Category (k)  
Percentage of net 
annual income 
committed* (θ) 
Cost of 
pooling a/c 
Adjustment factor 
to avoid adverse 
selection 
λ= θMale/θFemale 
Male and female 
pooled a 1.20%   
Female only b 1.35% 1.11 0.80 Belgium 
Male only c 1.08%   
Male and female 
pooled a 0.97%   
Female only b 1.26% 1.21 0.63 Germany 
Male only c 0.80%   
Male and female 
pooled a 0.87%   
Female only b 1.05% 1.15 0.72 United Kingdom 
Male only c 0.76%   
 
* Duration of contract (D)=25 years  
 
Risk-shifting 
 
An alternative approach may consist of asking society to compensate for the low-
earning group (here women), rather than shifting the cost of income-contingency onto 
the rest of the cohort (males). This is the risk shifting solution that most countries with 
ICL or HCC schemes, have implemented thus far (Palacios, 2004). Whilst full risk-
shifting is clearly an efficient answer to adverse selection, our simulations presented 
in Table 6 indicate that the cost to the taxpayer would be non-negligible. In the EU 
context, as indicated by Barr (2001, 2002), full risk shifting could lead public 
watchdogs39 to classify student contracts as public debt.  
 
                                              
39 Eurostat for the EU member states. 
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Compulsory pooling 
 
Another solution to mitigate the adverse selection problem, in the context of full or 
partial risk-pooling, is to impose participation in the income-contingent scheme. 
Borrowing money to finance higher education would be mandatory. This would 
clearly require the involvement of public authorities as this measure would turn out to 
be unpopular amongst certain categories of graduates, as the results of Tables 7 and 8 
reveal.  
 
The practical response to adverse selection might combine risk shifting, separation 
and compulsory pooling depending on the exact configuration of the problem as well 
as the political preferences of different countries. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
The principal contribution of this paper is the finding that instruments of private 
finance, combining deferred and income-contingent payments, offer an opportunity to 
raise significant sums in order to (re)finance higher education in Europe without 
significantly eroding the profitability of the educational investment of individuals with 
heterogeneous lifetime incomes, and simultaneously addressing the risky nature of the 
investment. These results hold for a sample of countries (UK, Germany and Belgium) 
with potentially diverging institutional arrangements for their higher education, labour 
markets and fiscal systems.  
 
We estimate that investments of up to 20,000 € would reduce the current private rate 
of return by less than one percentage point. This is an upper bound estimate, as it is 
computed under the pessimistic assumption that the additional resources have no 
positive effect on individuals’ earning prospects. An investment of 5,000 € would 
represent a cost ranging from 0.47% (Germany) to 0.78% (Belgium) of lifetime (24-
65) net income. One of the distinguishing advantages of ICL and HCC, compared to 
FEE (or ordinary loans), is that these moderate reductions in the rate of return can be 
achieved across the distribution of graduates’ incomes. As ICL and HCC create a 
significant payment gradient amongst individuals from the same cohort, they 
simultaneously display strong vertical justice properties. 
 
The comparison between HCC and ICL reveals that they are almost equally effective 
at indexing contributions to lifetime income. By definition, HCC are synonymous 
with contributions that are strictly proportional to income. ICL a priori modulates 
contributions in a much less precise way. This is certainly true from a cross-sectional 
perspective. However, it is less clear from an inter-temporal one, as lifetime average 
probabilities of defaulting on ICL can be relatively well indexed to lifetime income. 
 
Both ICL and HCC are income-contingent and thus contain an insurance component. 
It is this insurance element that allows contributions to be adapted to an individual’s 
lifetime income. The insurance mechanism is relatively expensive when applied to 
 39 
large populations of students that are heterogeneous in terms of income prospects. If 
the cost is pooled amongst graduates, payments contain a premium to cover those who 
default. The main advantage of pooling is that redistribution takes place within each 
cohort of graduates. Its drawback is its exposure to adverse selection, as potential high 
earners might exit the scheme for fear of being in a cohort with too many low earners. 
Our last set of computations suggests that high-earning graduates would face an HCC 
price tag inflated by up to 19% (UK) if pooled with low earners.  
 
We also propose an alternative. Investing less money in students opting for less 
profitable programs potentially eliminates the cost of pooling for high earners. This 
could be equated with the separation equilibrium solution. Its underlying logic is that 
students opting for programs, but also fields of study, offering lower income 
prospects, should borrow less money. But in the case of income differentials by 
gender (but also ethnicity, religion, region of origin, etc.), policy-makers, and 
individuals in general, might be unwilling to accept a system that imposes different 
terms. A solution would then be to ask taxpayers to compensate the lower paid groups, 
like women. This is the risk-shifting solution. Full risk-shifting is clearly an answer to 
adverse selection. However, its cost for the taxpayer could be significant. In the 
European context, complete risk-shifting could also lead to the classification of 
student contracts as public debt, which would further inflate the already bloated public 
debt that most European countries struggle with. Another solution to adverse selection 
would consist of maintaining a certain level of pooling – and thus redistribution – 
whilst imposing participation. However, given the lack of support for this amongst 
certain categories of graduates, implementation might generate issues of political 
economy. 
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Appendix 
Since we do not observe unemployment and other replacement benefits directly for 
Belgium, we use two simplifying assumptions to estimate them. First, following Van 
der Linden and Dor (2001), we consider a replacement ratio of 34%. This value 
adequately reflects the situation of cohabitants and the fact that benefits are decreasing 
over time for some categories of individuals. Second, we assume that replacement 
earnings’ benefits are sensitive to past income, since they are indexed on former 
income within a certain interval. According to Office National de l'Emploi (2003), the 
proportion of non-employed persons, for which the benefit is proportionally linked to 
former income, is 29%.  
 
Hence, for each of the 4,029 individuals in the data set the level of income is equal to: 
 
yi = mi wi + (1-mi/12) rep (1) 
gyi = mi gwi + (1-mi/12) rep (2) 
 
with  
-  rep = a W + b AW 
-  a = (0.29) 0.34 = 0.0986  
-  b = (1 - 0.29) 0.34 = 0.2414 
-  mi the number of months in 2002 during which individual i had a 
remunerated job; 
-  W the average net wage amongst working indviduals with the same age, 
gender and degree as individual i;  
-  AW the economy-wide average net wage of working individuals; 
 
 
